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Introduction/Abstract 
Recent work within such disparate research areas as the epistemology of 
perception, theories of well-being, animal and medical ethics, the philosophy 
of consciousness, and theories of understanding in philosophy of science and 
epistemology has featured disconnected discussions of what is arguably a single 
underlying question: What is the value of consciousness? The purpose of this paper is 
to review some of this work and place it within a unified theoretical framework that 
makes contributions (and contributors) from these disparate areas more visible to each 
other. 
 
1. Preliminaries: Three Kinds of Value  
Before reviewing recent work bearing on the question ‘What is the value of 
consciousness?,’ it might be useful to get clearer on what the question means.  
 When we speak about the value of X, there are three different kinds of value we 
might have in mind: epistemic, ethical, or aesthetic. These are fundamentally distinct 
and incommensurable: one may find a certain quantity Q of epistemic value more 
valuable than some quantity Q* of epistemic value, but when considering a quantity Q 
of epistemic value and a quantity Q* of ethical value, no meaning attaches to the 
question of which is more valuable simpliciter.  
The traditionalist formula ‘the true, the good, and the beautiful’ speaks to this 
three-way distinction between epistemic, ethical, and aesthetic value. It just builds in a 
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commitment to three kinds of value monism: truth monism about epistemic value (the 
idea that truth is the only intrinsic epistemic value, with all other epistemic value being 
merely instrumental), goodness monism about ethical value (goodness as the only 
intrinsic ethical value, all other ethical value being instrumental), and beauty monism 
about aesthetic value (beauty the only intrinsic aesthetic value etc.).  
Such monism is more or less defensible in each domain, but in none is it 
analytically true. Veritists such as Alvin Goldman (1999 Ch.3) have defended truth 
monism about epistemic value. Still, other intrinsic epistemic values have occasionally 
been proffered, notably understanding (Kvanvig 2003). Goodness monism about ethical 
value is perhaps easiest to hear as analytic, yet debates on the relationship between the 
right and the good (starting with Sidgwick 1874) are naturally taken to have implications 
for such monism. Beauty monism about aesthetic value, meanwhile, is by far the most 
contentious; indeed, its rejection has become something of an orthodoxy in 
contemporary aesthetics (see Danto 2002 for review).  
Regardless of how these axiological debates pan out, the question ‘What is the 
value of consciousness?’ is profitably factorized into the following six questions: 
• What is the intrinsic epistemic value of consciousness? 
• What is the intrinsic ethical value of consciousness? 
• What is the intrinsic aesthetic value of consciousness? 
• What is the instrumental epistemic value of consciousness? 
• What is the instrumental ethical value of consciousness? 
• What is the instrumental aesthetic value of consciousness? 
This factorization is the result of two crosscutting distinctions: between epistemic, 
ethical, and aesthetic value and between intrinsic and instrumental value. (I use the 
expression ‘intrinsic value’ to denote non-instrumental value, not value that something 
has independently of its relations to other items. Another term often used for this is 
‘final value.’) 
A couple of further clarifications are in order. First, the term ‘consciousness’ 
introduces its own potential ambiguities, most notably between ‘phenomenal’ and 
‘access’ consciousness (Block 1995): a mental state may be said to be conscious 
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because it is something the subject experiences (there is something it is like for her to 
be in it), or because it is functionally highly integrated and influences information 
processing across many parts of the cognitive system. As most recent work about the 
value of consciousness concerns the phenomenal notion, this will be our focus 
hereafter. 
 Two kinds of question should be distinguished, though, about the value of 
phenomenal consciousness. For the latter is a generic property that admits of several 
species: perceptual, algedonic, emotional, perhaps cognitive, perhaps agentive, and so 
on (Kriegel 2015). This introduces an ambiguity in the question ‘What is the value of 
phenomenal consciousness?’ Suppose that fish and birds are valuable but amphibians, 
reptiles, and mammals are not. If someone asks whether animals are valuable, in one 
sense we should answer positively, since fish and birds are valuable; but in another 
sense we should answer negatively, since being an animal is not as such valuable. Thus 
the question of the value of phenomenal consciousness is usefully disambiguated into a 
‘generic’ and a ‘specific’ reading: 
• What value does phenomenal consciousness as such have? 
• What value(s) do some species of phenomenal consciousness have? 
This is important, because Andrew Lee (2018) recently argued that phenomenal 
consciousness is not intrinsically ethically valuable, on the grounds that only algedonic 
phenomenology has intrinsic ethical value, while other types of phenomenal 
consciousness are value-neutral. But from a different perspective it is possible to argue 
that phenomenal consciousness is intrinsically valuable on the grounds that its 
algedonic species is. What all can agree on is that Lee answers in the negative the 
genus question and in the positive the species question.  
 A last clarification: Although the question ‘What is the value of consciousness’ 
invites answers of the grammatical form ‘Consciousness is V’ (where V stands for a value 
property), philosophers may find consciousness valuable who do not take 
consciousness to be some substance that instantiates properties. (Might it be a first-
order property that instantiates second-order value properties? For some substitution 
instances of V, this will not work. Thus, truth is likely an intrinsic epistemic value, but it is 
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not a property that properties can have: beliefs, judgments, propositions, statements, 
etc. can be true or false, but properties cannot.) I propose that we see ‘Consciousness 
is V’ as claiming that anything that instantiates the property of being conscious will 
perforce also instantiate the property of being V – and will do so because it instantiates 
the property of being conscious. On this interpretation, the ‘deep grammar’ of 
‘Consciousness is V’ is something like this: For any mental state m, if m is conscious, 
then m is V, and is V in virtue of being conscious. Accordingly, the question ‘What is the 
value of consciousness?’ really comes to this: What value properties do conscious states 
have in virtue of being conscious?  
This is effectively a question about grounding: about what holds in virtue of 
what. In the theory of ground, a distinction is sometimes drawn between full and partial 
ground (Fine 2012). For instance, we may say that knowledge is grounded in belief, 
meaning that belief is a partial ground of knowledge; but we may also say that belief is 
grounded in tracking relation R and mean that R is the full ground of belief. By the 
same token, when we claim that something is valuable in virtue of being conscious, we 
must specify whether we mean ‘in part in virtue of being conscious’ or ‘entirely in virtue 
of being conscious.’ 
With these clarifications of our question in place, let us review some elements of 
answer in various recent discussions of consciousness.  
 
2.  The Epistemic Value of Consciousness 
The epistemic value of consciousness has been the most explicitly explored. In 
particular, there is a lively debate about the role of perceptual phenomenology in 
providing a special kind of epistemic justification. James Pryor and Michael Huemer 
have argued, influentially, that perceptual experience provides immediate (roughly: 
belief-independent) prima facie justification for perceptual beliefs. (This is what they call 
‘dogmatism’ and ‘phenomenal conservatism’ respectively.) Both have also made the 
additional claim that it is an aspect of the phenomenal character of perceptual 
experiences that confers on them this epistemic significance. Moreover, they seem to 
have roughly the same phenomenal feature in mind – what Pryor (2000: 547 fn37) calls 
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‘phenomenal force’ and Huemer (2001: 77) calls ‘forcefulness.’ This is a feature external 
to the experience’s content and is the phenomenal analogue of assertoric force: it 
presents the content of the experience as real or obtaining.  
Naturally, Pryor’s and Huemer’s views have faced various objections. Recently, 
however, a number of authors have targeted specifically their views’ phenomenological 
dimension. A commonly explored line of objection goes like this: the phenomenal 
character of perceptual experiences – including their force(fulness) – is not relevantly 
different from that of certain imaginative experiences; yet imagining something does 
not provide justification (immediate or otherwise) for perceptual beliefs; therefore, nor 
does the phenomenal character of perceptual experiences (Ghijsen 2014, Siegel and 
Silins 2015, Teng 2018). 
Interestingly, even if we grant that perceptual phenomenology plays a role in 
immediate justification, and to that extent has epistemic value, it is noteworthy that this 
value claim is limited in at least two ways. First, it concerns the epistemic value not of 
phenomenal consciousness as such, but only of one species of it – perceptual 
phenomenology. Secondly, it concerns only instrumental epistemic value. Certainly 
veritists will claim that epistemic rationality is valuable only insofar as it is instrumental in 
promoting true belief; but even such proposed alternative intrinsic values as 
understanding go beyond epistemic rationality.1 Now, the fact that the relevant value is 
merely instrumental, and attaches only to perceptual consciousness, does not by itself 
mean that it is inconsequential. Pautz (2017), for instance, argues that this alone shows 
that most versions of physicalism are false (roughly: because they cannot explain how 
physical properties that differ in the physically tiniest ways can differ so dramatically in 
value). Still, it would be interesting to consider whether more ambitious epistemic-value 
claims could be made on behalf of consciousness. 
As far as generalizing from the perceptual case, one general strategy is to push 
broadly perceptual models of certain mental phenomena and then use them to extend 
perceptual phenomenology’s epistemic role to other species of phenomenal 
consciousness. This line is pursued most clearly by Eli Chudnoff, who argues that the 
phenomenal feature crucial to perception’s epistemic role – what he calls 
‘presentational phenomenology’ (more on this below) – is also found in intuition, 
introspection, and recollection (Chudnoff 2012). Although he develops in detail mostly 
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the account of how intuitions provides immediate justification for certain a priori beliefs 
in virtue of their presentational phenomenology (Chudnoff 2011), he would presumably 
also claim that introspective experiences immediately justify certain psychological 
beliefs and recollections immediately justify certain beliefs about the past – and do so 
in virtue of their presentational phenomenology. Other philosophers have also 
defended a broadly perceptual model of emotional experiences as value perceptions 
and argued that value beliefs can be prima facie justified by emotional phenomenology 
in the same way perceptual beliefs can be prima facie justified by perceptual 
phenomenology (cf. Elgin 2008).2 
If every type of phenomenal consciousness could be shown to provide 
immediate justification for some type of belief, that epistemic value could be seen to 
belong to phenomenal consciousness as such. This is of course a tall order, and nothing 
like this has been approximated in the extant literature. Even then, in any case, it would 
still be merely instrumental value. What are prospects for finding some intrinsic 
epistemic value in consciousness?  
The most promising approach, I suspect, might be found outside the veritistic 
fold – in particular in the idea that there is an intrinsically valuable form of 
understanding that is grounded in conscious experience. An argument to that effect is 
recently developed by Bourget (2017).3 The argument proceeds in two steps. The first 
notes a common theme in theories of understanding within epistemology and 
philosophy of science, namely, that understanding requires grasping. Opinions differ on 
just what grasping is, and what exactly needs to be grasped for something to be 
understood; but they agree that without grasp there is no understanding (Gordon 
2017). Bourget gives the following illuminating example: when told by trustworthy 
authorities that the sun is approximately 1,300,000 bigger than the earth, we believe 
this (correctly) but in a sense have no grasp of what this really means; when later we are 
told that that is like the difference between a basketball and an apple seed, something 
happens with us which can rightly be described as an epistemic achievement. But the 
achievement is a peculiar one: we have not acquired any further evidence for the 
proposition that the sun is approximately 1,300,000 bigger than the earth. Rather, we 
have gained a measure of insight into what it really means that the sun is approximately 
1,300,000 bigger than the earth – we grasp the fact in a way we did not previously. The 
second step of Bourget’s argument is to ask what distinguishes believing that p without 
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grasping p and with grasping p, and argue that the difference has to do with 
phenomenal consciousness: we believe with grasping when our belief is accompanied 
by a phenomenal experience with the content p; we believe without grasping when our 
belief is not so accompanied. Bourget argues that this explanation is better in various 
respects than functionalist and other explanations. 
One limitation of Bourget’s discussion is that he does not tell us what kind of 
experience makes for grasping, and indeed seems to suggest that any experience 
would do – something which seems rather implausible. (If one believes that the weather 
is nice while experiencing hope that the weather is nice, that does not seem to make 
for grasping.) But we may find help on this point in Chudnoff’s aforementioned notion 
of presentational phenomenology: a phenomenal characteristic whereby a mental state 
not only represents p but also makes it seem to the subject that she is aware of the 
truthmaker of the proposition p. Using this notion of presentational phenomenology, 
we may surmise that the key difference between believing that p with grasping and 
without grasping is that although both beliefs represent p, only the former involves a 
presentational phenomenology whereby the subject seems to be aware of the 
truthmaker of p.  
 
5.  The Ethical Value of Consciousness 
At a most basic level, we engage in ethics to answer the following question: How 
should I live? From this perspective, it is useful to organize ethics’ agenda around three 
separate questions about the good life: 
1) What makes a life good for the one who lives it? 
2) What makes a life morally good? 
3) What is the relationship between a morally good life and a life good for the one 
who lives it? 
Let us say that what makes life good for the one who lives it is prudential value, while 
what makes life morally good is moral value. In these terms, most recent discussions of 
the ethical value of consciousness concern its prudential value; nonetheless some touch 
on its moral value.  
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5.1. Consciousness and well-being 
The question of life’s goodness for the one who lives it is addressed in the lively 
literature on well-being. A common if unloved classification divides theories of well-
being into three types: hedonist, desire-satisfaction, and objective-list theories. 
Hedonism leads most directly to an intrinsic prudential value for consciousness. 
According to it, well-being is determined by the distribution of hedonically valenced 
experiences, notably pleasure and pain: the more pleasure and the less pain, the better 
the life for the one who lives it. To this we only need to add that pleasure and pain 
contribute to well-being in virtue of their phenomenology (Bramble 2016) to obtain an 
intrinsic prudential value for (one species of) phenomenal consciousness.  
On its face, this additional claim is antecedently plausible. Imagine a functional 
duplicate of yours with the following peculiarity: its mental states that play the pleasure 
role always lack phenomenology, while its mental states that play the pain role are 
phenomenally experienced just as yours are. From a hedonic standpoint, this ill-fated 
duplicate seems to lead a rather sorrowful existence, and certainly not to live a life as 
good as yours.  
 In recent discussions, however, the role of phenomenology in hedonic well-being 
has been called into question, with some authors defending non-phenomenological 
forms of hedonism. According to Heathwood (2007), for instance, what makes a mental 
state pleasure is not any specific phenomenology, but a desire directed at a 
phenomenology. What motivates this is the thought that pleasures can be extremely 
varied phenomenologically, so that what unifies them is simply the fact that one desires 
them (Heathwood 2007: 26). In defense of phenomenological hedonism, however, we 
might note that the felt qualities of, say, seeing blue, tasting honey, and feeling velvet 
are just as different as the felt qualities of pleasures produced by orgasm and by a 
particularly well-crafted George Eliot sentence. Yet as we saw in §2, many 
epistemologists assign epistemic value to perceptual phenomenology, as the genus (or 
determinable) of which visual, gustatory, and tactile phenomenology are species (or 
determinates). By the same token, we can assign prudential value to pleasure 
phenomenology as the genus of which many species can be recognized (Crisp 2006: 
109). This is not to say that there need not be any phenomenal commonality among 
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pleasures; rather, it is to say that the commonality is liable to be as phenomenally 
subtle as that among all forms of perception.  
Arguably, in the background here is a question about what makes pleasure of 
value to us. The non-phenomenological hedonist thinks it is not simply the fact that 
pleasure has a certain phenomenology, but that we like that phenomenology and want 
to experience it. The phenomenological hedonist holds that this puts the cart before 
the horse: intuitively, we like and want the phenomenology of pleasure because of what 
that phenomenology is like. It would be odd, according to her, to treat as brute and 
inexplicable the facts that we like and desire pleasure phenomenology and dislike and 
are averse to pain phenomenology. These facts do not seem like rock bottom. They 
seem obviously explicable, namely by the nature of pleasure and pain phenomenology 
(see Bramble 2013 for discussion).  
 It is important to appreciate that phenomenological hedonists do not typically 
appeal to a narrow notion of pleasure and pain as punctate bodily sensations, but to a 
wider notion encompassing the whole panoply of hedonically valenced experiences in 
our psychological repertoire. Joshua Shepherd (2018) has recently presented a 
particularly developed account of what he calls ‘phenomenal value’ – in essence, 
phenomenally grounded prudential value – in terms of ‘affective-evaluative’ 
phenomenal properties. These are phenomenal properties which involve both hedonic 
valence and evaluation of their objects. Thus, taking pleasure in beer, being content 
with beer, and hoping for beer both (i) feel good and (ii) evaluate beer positively; while 
pain, embarrassment, and anger both (i) feel bad and (ii) evaluate their objects 
negatively. For Shepherd, then, there is an evaluative dimension that must supplement 
valence in the phenomenal grounds of prudential value.  
Arguably, however, the temptation to incorporate evaluative phenomenology in 
the phenomenal grounds of prudential value is shaken when we consider the rare 
instances in which the correlation between the evaluative and hedonic dimensions 
breaks down. Thus, yearning for x feels bad but evaluates x positively. Intuitively, 
having a lot of yearning in one’s life makes life (other things being equal) worse for one. 
 Hedonism is a minority position in contemporary ethics, largely due to Nozick’s 
(1981: 42-3) ‘experience machine’ objection. This is the objection that hedonism cannot 
vindicate the intuition that it would be rational for us to decline an invitation to enter a 
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machine that would simulate exactly the same life we would otherwise have but add to 
it a bit of extra pleasure (one more delicious strawberry!). Now, recent defenses of 
hedonism have multiplied the attempts to debunk the experience-machine intuition 
(Silverstein 2000, Crisp 2006, De Brigard 2010). It is worth noting, however, that even if 
we accept the experience-machine objection at face value, all it really shows is that 
experience is not sufficient for well-being, or that it does not determine well-being all 
by itself. The objection does nothing to undermine the necessity of experience for well-
being, the idea that experience makes an ineluctable contribution to well-being. For 
suppose you had to choose between the following two options: either (a) you enter the 
experience machine and lead a life phenomenally approximately indistinguishable from 
the one you would be leading outside the machine; or (b) you stay outside the machine 
but lose all phenomenal consciousness, carrying on your ‘public’ life entirely 
undisturbed – but as a complete zombie. It would seem folly to choose (b) in this 
scenario. Thus the fact that in the original experience-machine scenario you are 
guaranteed a continued experiential life outside the machine is crucial in sustaining the 
intuition that it is preferable for you not to plug in. At most, then, the experience-
machine argument shows that (hedonically valenced) experience is only a partial 
ground of intrinsic prudential value. 
It is independently plausible that hedonically valenced is only a partial ground of 
prudential value. For consider the following choice: either (a) you submit today to a 
medical procedure that would irreversibly zombify you overnight (though it will leave 
your cognitive and motivational architecture as functionally unchanged as possible) or 
(b) your life from now on will skew consistently towards the unpleasant (it is not that you 
will be relentlessly tortured, but just that you will experience considerably more 
frustration and pain than pleasure and satisfaction). I think most of us will have no 
difficulty choosing (b). At least as long as the pain is not too overwhelming, most of us 
find it far better to live with it than to end our conscious life. This seems to suggest that 
we also value being conscious as such, regardless of the hedonic quality of our 
consciousness.4 If this is right, then prudential value is at best grounded partly in 
hedonic phenomenology and partly in phenomenal consciousness as such.  
ge 
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Partly under the pressure of the experience-machine objection, many ethicists today 
prefer a desire-satisfaction theory, according to which a person’s well-being is a 
function of her desires being satisfied. It is not the distribution of pleasure vs. pain that 
matters, but the distribution of satisfied vs. frustrated desires. Importantly, the notion of 
satisfaction at play here is not subjective but objective: for a person’s desire to be 
satisfied is not for that person to experience a phenomenal feeling of satisfaction, but 
for the desire’s content-fixing satisfaction conditions to be met. It is this notion of 
satisfaction that helps the desire-satisfaction theorist avoid the experience-machine 
problem: in the experience machine, we have the impression that our desires are being 
satisfied, and accordingly experience feelings of satisfaction, but our desires are not 
really satisfied.  
 Neil Levy (2014) uses the desire-satisfaction account of well-being to argue that 
phenomenal consciousness is not particularly valuable. Even if we suppose, rather 
implausibly, that all desires are phenomenally conscious, and even more implausibly, 
that their satisfaction conditions are fully fixed by their phenomenal character, what 
matters for prudential value on this view is not just the having of desires, but their being 
satisfied. Prudential value comes into the world when we move from desires to satisfied 
desires. And what makes a desire satisfied has nothing to do with consciousness, but 
with the objective facts about the world (except of course when consciousness is part of 
what the desire is a desire for).5  
 Charles Siewert (forthcoming) offers a sustained argument against this desire-
satisfaction-based threat to prudential value in consciousness. His argument proceeds 
somewhat as follows. Suppose you are offered the following deal by an omnipotent 
deity: if you submit to a zombification procedure that retains as much of your cognitive 
and motivational architecture as possible but deprives you of phenomenology, the 
deity will see to it that an overwhelming majority of your current desires be satisfied. 
Should you accept the deal if you want to make your life better (for you)? Intuitively, 
you should not. Intuitively, your life will not be better for you if you submit to this 
procedure; it will be much worse. In fact, there is a perfectly good sense in which your 
life will be no more (Cutter 2017). For suppose you are offered a variant of the deal 
where after a week in a state of zombiehood, you would be killed and replaced with 
another zombie cooked up in a Petri dish – but your current desires will continue being 
methodically satisfied one by one. It is entirely unclear what reason you have to find this 
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new variant of the deal any less appealing than the previous one. Both offers are, 
intuitively, really terrible for you: far from making your life better for you, they would 
end your life in any prudentially significant sense of ‘your life.’ (It is important here to 
screen off intuitions about whether it would be morally good to accept the deal. You 
might affect a great deal of good in the world if you thus sacrifice yourself to secure the 
prospective satisfaction of all your geopolitical and macroeconomic wishes. But that 
would still be a sacrifice: your own well-being would be the price you would heroically 
pay for things going well for others.) 
 The third type of theory of well-being (in common taxonomies) is the objective-
list theory. The general idea is that a life is good for the one who lives it to the extent 
that it features as many items from a privileged set of goodness-conferring elements. 
Strictly speaking, however, hedonism and desire-satisfaction theory also satisfy this 
general characterization. What marks off objective-list theories are two main features, 
one captured in ‘objective’ and one in ‘list.’ The ‘objective’ part is that the goodness-
conferring elements must be such independently of our subjective reactions to them: it 
is not because we enjoy or want them, or even because we are aware of having them, 
that they make our lives better. The ‘list’ part intimates a strong tendency toward 
pluralism: we expect the goodness-conferring elements to be several, rather than 
reduce to a single source. Thus a typical objective-list theory would cite love and 
friendship, achievement and self-realization, play and free time, appreciation of beauty, 
and a number of other elements the very presence of which in one’s life – regardless of 
one’s awareness of or attitude toward them – makes it a better life.  
 Objective-list theories may seem initially to be least accommodating for a special 
role of consciousness in well-being. But in fact most such theories do cite hedonically 
valenced experiences in their list of objective goodness-conferring elements. Thus, 
Fletcher (2013) includes happiness and pleasure in his objective list, while Murphy 
(2001) includes happiness, aesthetic experience, and ‘inner peace’ (which presumably 
feels quite nice!). To be sure, the fact that for such objective-list theories valenced 
experience is only one among many elements responsible for well-being diminishes 
considerably the prudential value of consciousness; but it does not annihilate it.  
Furthermore, we should keep in mind the coherence of a sort of limit case of 
objective-list theory that includes on its list only conscious experiences, though not only 
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hedonic ones. This kind of ‘list-experientialism’ is defended by van der Deijl 
(forthcoming) and is endorsed by Siewert (personal communication). Van der Deijl cites 
self-understanding and novelty as experiential goods that supplement pleasure in 
making life good. Other philosophers have belabored the value of cognitive 
phenomenology. Galen Strawson (2011: 299), for instance, argues that without 
cognitive phenomenology life would be ‘pretty boring.’ Thus one may draw a longish 
list of valuable experiences that go beyond the hedonically valenced, and ground well-
being in it. And as noted above, we may well value having conscious experience as 
such (so long it is not too agonizing). In this limit case of objective-list theory, then, 
experience regains its status as full ground of intrinsic prudential value.6  
5.2. Consciousness and morality 
Modern moral philosophy is dominated by three main approaches: consequentialism, 
deontology, and virtue ethics. In what follows, I will bracket virtue ethics, as I am 
unfamiliar with any links between it and the value of consciousness in the extant 
literature. But what is the outlook for a moral value for consciousness in the 
consequentialist and deontological frameworks? 
 Consequentialism is typically characterized as the view that an act is morally right 
to the extent that its consequences are morally good, with different versions of 
consequentialism issuing from different views on what would make a consequence 
morally good. One version is ‘welfarist consequentialism’: good consequence = more 
well-being in the world. In this version, consequentialism embeds theories of well-being 
in its account of moral value. Thus if one combines welfarist consequentialism with 
either phenomenological hedonism or ‘list-experientialism’ about well-being, one 
would obtain the result that consciousness is also the full ground of moral value. The 
former combination enjoys a sustained contemporary defense in Roger Crisp’s work. 
The combination of welfarist consequentialism and list-experientialism, however, is to 
my knowledge unexplored.   
 Deontological approaches emphasize motivation over consequences: they 
commend acting from the motive of duty rather than for the promotion of well-being. 
There is any number of views about what our moral duty is, of course, but the 
paradigmatic view here is surely Kant’s: our duty is to treat human beings as ends in 
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themselves rather than as mere means to our own ends. There is something about the 
presence of another person in a situation that, for Kant, puts the breaks on our pursuit 
of self-interest – the person ‘exacts respect for himself from all other rational beings in 
the world’ (Kant 1797: 186-7). That in virtue of which a person exacts respect, and 
merits being treated as an end, is what Kant (1785: 52) calls ‘dignity.’ Our fundamental 
duty, then, is to respect and treat as ends all creatures possessed of dignity; all our 
other, more ‘local’ duties derive essentially from this one.  
 For our purposes, the key question here is: What gives some things dignity and 
not others? Presumably, dignity is not a brute, inexplicable attribute that arbitrarily 
attaches itself to some entities and not others. More plausibly, things have certain 
empirical properties that ground their dignity – be these genetic, psychological, or 
other empirical (i.e., non-evaluative) properties. We have duties to other people, but 
not to rocks – and this must have to do with the factual differences between people 
and rocks. This opens up the possibility, argued for in Kriegel 2017, that the ground of 
dignity is precisely phenomenal consciousness. In broad strokes, the argument is this: 
to describe someone as having dignity is to ascribe to her a certain inviolability; and 
such inviolability attaches to conscious creatures precisely in virtue of the fact that the 
conscious experiences of each conscious creature can only be experienced by them. I 
can know about your sadness, and through empathy I may even experience a token 
sadness type-identical to your token sadness; but I cannot feel your token sadness. On 
the emerging view, an entity exacts respects and merits treatment as an end just if it is 
a phenomenally conscious creature.7 
 It might be objected that this fits poorly with Kant’s idea that dignity attaches to 
rational beings capable of setting ends. But bracketing the fact that a deontological 
view need not be Kantian in every respect, the objection faces a dilemma. Could an 
unconscious automaton be a rational end-setting being? If not, then (a) it would seem 
that rational end-setting status implies consciousness. But if a rational end-setting 
automaton is possible, then (b) intuitively, there is no particular reason for us to treat it 
as an end rather than a means. Insofar as we can envisage a future in which household 
robots set their own ends, as long as they remained certified zombies we would feel no 
more pressure to treat them as ends than we do our current-day Roombas. Both those 
future robots and today’s Roombas are characterized by one simple fact: there is 
nobody home.  
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 It is worth noting that one could always adopt a hybrid ethical theory combining 
deontological and consequentialist elements. Consider the following ecumenical moral 
maxim: Always maximize well-being in the world consistently with treating all creatures 
possessed of dignity as ends rather than mere means. To follow this maxim to the letter 
is to consider all one’s available courses of action, rule out the subset involving treating 
some dignitary as a mere means, and of the remaining courses of action pick that which 
maximizes well-being in the world. For all we said here, this kind of simple hybrid 
theory could be doubly consciousness-invoking, namely, if one adopts (a) either a 
hedonist or list-experientialist account of well-being and (b) the thesis that dignity is 
grounded in consciousness.  
 
6. The Aesthetic Value of Consciousness 
One area that remains virtually unexplored in the current literature is the aesthetic value 
of consciousness. We have many experiences of beauty in life, occasioned by 
encounter with art, nature, and even abstract structures. But do we have experiences 
that are themselves beautiful, and beautiful because they are experiences? This may 
seem doubtful. Certain experiences may, by their rarity and intricacy, exhibit aesthetic 
value; but it may well be their rarity or intricacy that grounds this value, rather than their 
being experiences.  
 Still, there is a broadly subjectivist tradition in aesthetics that grounds aesthetic 
value in experience in a different way. I have in mind the kind ‘secondary-quality’ 
account whereby an object’s being aesthetically valuable is a matter of its being 
disposed to elicit the right kind of aesthetic experience in the right kind of subject 
under the right kind of circumstance. The approach continues to command 
philosophical defense and development (e.g., Matthen 2018) and may be generically 
stated as follows: For any item x and intrinsic aesthetic value Vi, such that x is Vi, there is 
a kind of subject S, a kind of circumstance C, and a kind of aesthetic experience Æi, 
such that (i) x is disposed to elicit Æi in S under C and (ii) x is V in virtue of the fact that 
(i). Presumably, the phenomenology of aesthetic experience is crucial here: if an object 
elicited in us internal states with the functional role of aesthetic experience, but without 
the corresponding phenomenology, most subjectivists would be disinclined to consider 
it aesthetically valuable.  
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 The notion of aesthetic experience had been out of favor for much of the second 
half of the twentieth century, largely due to Dickie’s (1965) influential critique. But more 
recent discussion in the philosophy of perception have inspired a renewed interest in 
the putative phenomenon of aesthetic perception. One central issue has been what 
separates aesthetic from non-aesthetic perception. After all, it is perfectly possible to 
look at a painting or listen to a symphony without undergoing aesthetic experience. 
Nanay (2015) has argued that paradigmatic instances of aesthetic experience display a 
distinctive distribution of perceptual attention, absent in non-aesthetic perception. But 
it is also possible to appeal here to a non-perceptual, purely affective element. After all, 
intuitively a perceptual experience of a painting or a symphony does not amount to an 
aesthetic experience unless one also enjoys what one perceives. Indeed, a recent line 
of thought, starting from the observation that aesthetic experience occasioned by (e.g.) 
literature and conceptual art is not perceptually based (Shelley 2003), has led some 
authors to identify aesthetic experience with the relevant affective element, recasting 
perceptual experience as merely contingently and causally linked to aesthetic 
experience proper (Goffin 2019). Alternatively, one might construe aesthetic experience 
as a pleasure taken in the apprehension of certain objects, where ‘apprehension’ covers 
both perceptual and non-perceptual (e.g., imaginative) awareness (Matthen 2017). Such 
affect-first accounts render more urgent the question of what distinguishes aesthetic 
from non-aesthetic enjoyment. A traditional thought is that aesthetic enjoyment in an 
object is enjoyment in it for its own sake, that is, independently of any further good that 
might come out of it. This approach is developed within a rich functionalist framework 
by Matthen (2017), but criticized by Nanay (2018: 78), on the grounds that aesthetic 
experience is often directed at everyday scenes, and these are poor candidates for 
being enjoyed for their own sake. 
 Regardless of how aesthetic experience is ultimately understood, the secondary-
quality account of aesthetic value yields a grounding of aesthetic value in aesthetic 
phenomenology. However, the aesthetic value thus grounded in phenomenal 
consciousness is not an aesthetic value of consciousness: it is not the aesthetic 
experience itself which is beautiful, but the object of the experience. This raises the 
question of whether there is some intrinsic aesthetic value that attaches to 
consciousness itself.  
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Niikawa (ms) argues that the traditional notion of the sublime – something so 
incomprehensibly grand and imposing as to induce feelings of eluding our grasp in us – 
may apply to phenomenal consciousness. His argument centers on this reaction of awe 
that is either constitutive or at least diagnostic of the sublime. When we contemplate 
particularly vividly the so-called explanatory gap between phenomenal consciousness 
and the rest of the natural order, a certain intellectual type of awe descends on us, and 
does so fittingly. (Importantly, as many philosophers recognize, it is fitting to 
experience this awe even when one has credence higher than .5 in physicalism.) If 
consciousness is a fitting object of awe, and being a fitting object of awe is the mark of 
the sublime, then consciousness is sublime. 
 
Conclusion 
The primary purpose of this paper has been to sketch out a general framework within 
which the question of the value of consciousness – increasingly prominent in a variety of 
discussions across quite disconnected research areas – could be addressed in a 
systematic manner. In the first instance, the question is usefully factorized into six types 
of question: about epistemic, ethical (both prudential and moral), and aesthetic value, 
either intrinsic or instrumental. To make progress on these questions, we must first have 
clear views on what the intrinsic values in each domain are. Once we have such views 
on the table, we can use standard philosophical techniques of analysis and 
argumentation to try and establish various relatively concrete theses. The more 
comprehensive our collection of such theses, the more comprehensive our account of 
the value of consciousness. 
 In the course of our discussion, we have identified a number of potential lines of 
thought leading to an intrinsic value for consciousness. First, if (1) understanding is an 
intrinsic epistemic value, (2) grasping is an ineluctable component of understanding, 
and (3) presentational phenomenology or some such phenomenal feature is necessarily 
involved in grasping, then (4) there is an intrinsic epistemic value partially grounded in 
(a species of) phenomenal consciousness. Secondly, if either phenomenological 
hedonism or ‘list-experientialism’ is true about well-being, then intrinsic prudential 
value is fully grounded in (certain species of) phenomenal consciousness (and may be 
partially grounded in phenomenal consciousness as such, namely, if the latter shows up 
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within one’s list-experientialism). Thirdly, if (1) either phenomenological hedonism or 
list-experientialism is true of well-being and (2) welfare consequentialism is true of 
moral value, then (3) intrinsic moral value is fully grounded in (the relevant species of) 
consciousness as well. Fourthly, if (1) phenomenal consciousness is the ground of 
dignity, and (2) dignity the ground of moral value, then by transitivity of ground, (3) 
phenomenal consciousness (as such) is the ground of moral value. Fifthly, if (1) the 
sublime is an intrinsic aesthetic value, (2) anything is sublime that elicits fitting awe, and 
(3) there is an intellectual kind of awe fittingly elicited by phenomenal consciousness, 
then (4) there is an intrinsic aesthetic value that attaches to phenomenal consciousness 
(as such).  
Each of these lines of thought is of course controversial. Some have courted 
actual controversy (e.g., phenomenological hedonism about prudential value). Others 
may increasingly do so over the coming years, as the topic of the value of 
consciousness comes more transparently to the forefront of a number of areas 
intersecting with the philosophy of consciousness.8 
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1 Some naïve realists, notably Keith Allen (forthcoming), have argued that perceptual 
experience, insofar as it provides us with contact with reality, is intrinsically rather than 
instrumentally valuable. It is not entirely clear from Allen’s discussion, however, whether he has 
epistemic or ethical value (or both) in mind. In any case, I am skeptical of Allen’s argument. The 
argument is that naïve realism is the only view of perceptual experience that can account for its 
intrinsic value as constituting contact with reality, because other views must claim that it is only 
in belief (and action) that contact with reality is achieved, and so perceptual experience is 
valuable only insofar as it is instrumental to the formation of beliefs (and actions). But most 
opponents of naïve realism would presumably claim that contact with reality is established in 
some perceptual experiences, namely the veridical one; it is just that it is the veridicality of the 
experience, not it sheer occurrence, that establishes contact. (Indeed, an appeal to belief here 
would be strange, since most opponents of naïve realism think that false belief and true belief 
belong to a single psychological kind just as veridical and falsidical perceptual experiences do.) 
 
2 Interestingly, this is denied by Chudnoff himself (Brogaard and Chudnoff 2016), roughly on the 
grounds that emotions derive their representational content from non-emotional states. 
 
3 Siewert (2013) argues for a central role for consciousness in specifically linguistic 
understanding. But this kind of understanding could be claimed to reduce to a species of 
knowledge (namely, knowledge of meaning), and this threatens to reduce the value 
consciousness plays in understanding to the value in plays in knowledge and justification 
(which, as we have seen, is merely instrumental).  
 
4 Thanks to Géraldine Carranante and Anna Giustina for making me see this.  
 
5 Levy deploys desire-satisfaction theory also to bear on a lively issue in medical ethics: whether 
patients in permanent vegetative state (PVS) can lead lives worth living. The debate has been 
shaken by the recent dramatic emergence of very strong evidence of consciousness in PVS 
patients. Levy and Savulescu (2009) argue, however, that phenomenal consciousness is not 
what matters here, but the patient’s hope that many of her interests will be satisfied. 
 
6 A hedonist may object that novelty, self-understanding, and so on are themselves pleasurable. 
But this seems to be so in a merely causal and not constitutive sense: novelty tends to produce 
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pleasure, it is not itself a pleasure. So van der Deijl is quite right that his theory is not a form of 
hedonism. The hedonist may still suspect that it is the tight causal link to pleasure that tempts 
our intuition toward this kind of list-experientialism. 
 
7 This ‘phenomenally grounded dignity’ approach entails that we have duties toward not only 
human beings but all conscious beings, including nonhuman conscious animals: these animals 
ought to be treated as ends, quite independently of the hedonic quality of their lives (Kriegel 
2013). 
 
8 This paper is influenced by an immense number of philosophical exchanges over the years. 
Exchanges with Lorenza D’Angelo, Anna Giustina, Tricia Magalotti, Olivier Massin and 
especially Charles Siewert stand out in my memory, but there were many others. I have also 
benefitted from presenting it at the Jean Nicod Institute, and am grateful to the audience 
there, in particular Géraldine Carranante, Anna Giustina, Michele Impagnatiello, Slawa Loev, 
and Takuya Niikawa. 
